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Incumbent Capability Enhancement in Response to Radical Innovations 
Abstract 
Schumpeterian market disequilibrium marked by entrepreneurial entry and incumbent exit has 
long held an important place in management literature. The extant literature has overwhelmingly 
championed the newcomer, despite incumbents’ obvious advantages in resources, experience and 
market knowledge. The current research provides evidence for the effectiveness of the 
incumbent’s strategy of capability enhancement (along an established technological trajectory) 
while responding to radical technological innovation. We develop a cognitive process model that 
integrates managerial cognition with capability development and deployment views, depicting 
the dynamics of the incumbent’s capability enhancement process. We analyze the cognitive 
drivers of organizational actions in all stages (rigidity, triggering event, and capability renewal) 
and elucidate the role of top management cognition in the processes of detecting and correcting 
errors in a strategic course of action. We ground our model in the case of a cork-stopper industry 
veteran’s decline: in the wine industry, corks ceded ground to screw tops and other stoppers. 
How a major company in the industry fought back in response to the emergence of these, in the 
industry context, radical technological innovations, provides the basis for our narrative. The 
proposed theoretical model contributes to literature on technology management (with regard to 
incumbent strategies in response to radical innovation threats) as well as the role of cognition in 
strategy (providing an explanation of the cognitive underpinnings of capability development).  




Hill and Rothaermel (2003) observe a persistent theme in the literature on technological 
innovation – the great struggle incumbents have when ‘crossing the abyss created by a radical 
technological innovation.’ Usually, the struggle leads to the incumbents’ decline, ‘while new 
entrants rise to market dominance by exploiting the new technology’ (p.257). The demise 
brought about by radical technological innovations has long been seen as integral for industrial 
rejuvenation, the very essence of entrepreneurial dynamics and wealth creation (Kirchhoff, 1991; 
Schumpeter, 1941). Here, the term ‘radical’ technological innovation refers to a new technology 
that simultaneously is (a), a preferred substitute for that already existing from the customer 
perspective (Arrow, 1962; Reinganum, 1983), (b) competence-destroying from the perspective 
of an incumbent’s technical capabilities (Tushman & Anderson, 1986, and (c), able to 
cannibalize the incumbent’s existing products (see, e.g., Wu, Wan, & Levinthal, 2014). The 
shock of the new does not always overwhelm the tradition of incumbency, however.  Some 
incumbents can and do respond successfully to radical innovation in their industry (Ansari & 
Krop, 2012): in Weick’s (1993) terms, tools are not always dropped. In line with this reasoning, 
in the current paper we build an inductive theory from a critical case study of an established 
industry leader successfully adapting to radical technological innovation in its industry. 
The focal industry is that of viniculture production, in particular the contribution of 
natural cork stoppers, which have been used by wine producers for sealing bottles for over two 
centuries. Starting in the 1990s, the role of the natural cork stoppers declined noticeably in the 
wine industry, in favour of alternative screw caps, made of plastic and aluminum.  Within this 
context, we investigate how the cork industry veteran (the single largest cork stopper 
manufacturer in the world, Corticeira Amorim (COR), with over 30% global market share and 
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annual production of 13 billion cork stoppers) fought back in response to the emergence of 
radical technological innovation.  
Our study analyzes the cognitive influences behind the dynamic strategic responses of 
this company. The resulting inductively developed cognitive process model integrates 
managerial cognition with capability development and deployment views and depicts the 
dynamics of an incumbent’s capability enhancement process at all stages (rigidity, triggering 
event, and capability renewal). Taking a cognitive view of capability enhancement drivers puts a 
particular emphasis on the role of top management cognition in the processes of detection and 
correction of errors in the course of action (Catino & Patriotta, 2013) with respect to the 
incumbent’s technological strategy.  
The study makes two distinct contributions. First, the model of emerging process 
contributes to the technological innovation management literature addressing incumbent 
challenges to radical technological innovation through enhancing established capabilities 
associated with existing technology by a “racing” strategy (Adner & Snow, 2010). Such a 
strategy is intended to extend performance to the appropriate level. Second, to the seasoned 
observer of the strategy literature, it might appear as if it is only resources, competitive forces, or 
abstracted capabilities that drive strategy but as Powell (2014) argues, this is a result of the 
‘creeping impersonalism’ that has characterized the strategy field since its inception.  We follow 
his advocacy of the need for a personalist rebalancing of strategy; thus, our research adds to the 
small but important body of work on the role of managerial cognition. We address the processual 
dynamics of incumbent domain negligence prior to further capability development and 
deployment. While cognition, as “information processing, knowledge structure mapping and 
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concept attainment” (Rialp-Criado et al., 2010), is finding an increasingly important place in 
strategy, we know little about how incumbents avert potential disruption. The focus on 
managerial cognition is framed by engaging with the CEO of a family business as a key 
respondent.  We integrate managerial cognition with the processual dynamics of incumbent 
capability enhancement, analyzing the cognitive drivers of organizational actions. The study 
reinforces the importance of personal managerial cognition in processes of external threat 
detection, analysis, and course correction. 
The paper starts with a brief review of prior literature linking managerial cognition to 
incumbent firms’ strategies when faced with radical innovation. Then, we discuss the focal 
context of a traditional industry (cork stoppers) exposed to a rising radical innovation (alternative 
stoppers). Next, we introduce the research method of a critical case study and qualitative 
analysis. The emerging findings in chronological themes are linked back to the prior literature 
(on managerial cognition and capability renewal), culminating in the process model of capability 
enhancement at the focal firm (Figure 1). In the discussion we provide generalize the findings 
theoretically, while in the conclusion we summarize contributions and limitations of the study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: MANAGERIAL COGNITION AND INCUMBENTS’ 
RESPONSE TO RADICAL INNOVATION 
Scholars have studied managerial cognition to explain incumbents’ inadequate responses 
to new entrants (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Rosenbloom & Christensen, 1994). From an 
organizational perspective a number of reasons for inadequate responses to competitors’ radical 
innovation have been suggested. Amongst these are the inhibitive roles of organizational inertia 
(Gilbert, 2005; Hannan & Freeman, 1984), structured routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), and the 
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existing competencies trap (Leonard-Barton, 1992) on the part of incumbents faced with 
challenges. Not being weighed down by liabilities of oldness, new entrants are more usually seen 
as radical innovators (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994; Christensen & Bower, 1996). By 
possessing an “attacker’s advantage” (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Foster, 1986) based on 
the shock of the new, newcomers triumph over incumbents (Henderson & Clark, 1990).  
Incumbents that respond creatively to challenges sense changing events as a threat 
demanding action: a threat not constituted as such is a poor basis for a strategic response 
(Trahms et al., 2013; Danneels, 2011; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). Emerging research incorporates 
managerial cognition or sensemaking – how top management perceives and interprets the 
environment – to understand organizational responses to challenges. Working out “what´s going 
on?” (Weick et al., 2005) requires the construction of reality in terms ‘defined through social 
processes wherein interpretations are offered and affirmed, modified, or abandoned according to 
their congruence with others' interpretations’ (Ford & Baucus, 1987, p. 367). Of course, agreeing 
what is going on might signify unanimity based only on ignorance, hubris, misdiagnosis or an 
incorrect analysis of the evidence. Beyond appropriate sensemaking there has to be action that 
subsequent processes affirm as appropriate and effective. 
Appropriate and effective incumbent responses to radical innovation involve either 
creating new capabilities or reconfiguring existing ones, where a capability implies having a 
“specific and intended purpose” (Helfat & Winter, 2011). Sensemaking of that which is enacted 
as the external environment, as events and understandings of them change, produces managerial 
cognitions that determine whether existing organizational routines (or competencies) are 
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appropriate for managing changing circumstances. They represent filters for understanding 
present capability and potential incapability in the face of the new challenges grasped.  
In a comprehensive longitudinal case study of Smith Corona, Danneels (2011) suggests 
that, “managerial cognition about firm resources” is crucial in explaining the change in 
established routines, “as the identification of resources and the understanding of their fungibility 
affect which directions of renewal are pursued”(p. 3). In line with this cognitive view, the earlier 
in-depth case study on Polaroid by Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) revealed how the cognitive inertia 
of Polaroid’s corporate executives created difficulties in adapting to digital imaging. Most 
notably, when analyzing the role of rigidities and cognitive frames, Gilbert (2005) identified two 
reasons for inadequate responses: resource rigidity arising from embeddedness in existing 
routines, leading to failure to change processes. Yet, whereas the aforementioned studies 
exemplify the role of cognition in making what, with the benefit of hindsight, were obviously the 
wrong choices in response to radical innovations, in the current study we address the question of 
how the cognitive processes within an incumbent can facilitate the emergence of an appropriate 
and effective response strategy.  
Extant literature has shown that ‘preserving established product, service, or process 
architectures in the face of troubled organizational performance’ (McKinley et al., 2014: 94) can 
lead to a vicious circle of decline as the old ideas are adhered to and new ones fail to emerge. 
Inertia sets in, a situation in which ‘organizations often resist change even when their 
environments threaten them with extinction’ (Miller & Friesen, 1980, p. 591). Osiyevskyy & 
Dewald (2015) argue that in contrary cases where incumbents’ enthusiastically adopt radical 
approaches the consequences can be equally as disastrous as either refusal to adopt or a rigid 
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response in doing so. The European airline industry (Vlaar, De Vries, & Willenborg, 2005) 
presents a case of the “incumbent’s curse” in adapting to technological changes. Technological 
changes introduced by new entrants can serve as a trigger for the initiation of internal innovation 
processes in incumbents (Mone et al., 1998; Staw et al., 1981; McKinley et al., 2014), a scenario 
invariably characterized as being one in which necessity is the mother of innovation. The role of 
cognition is vital in changing capabilities. Organizational capabilities (Aaltonen & Lanzara, 
2015), underlain by routines, are expressed in coordinated patterns of repetitive sets of activities 
constituting organizational skills (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Miner, Gong, Baker & O’Toole, 
2011; Winter, 1990). Managerial cognition plays a key role in sensing, interpreting, encoding, 
and retaining prior experiences in the construction of organizational routines and responses to 
competitive threats (Gavetti, 2005; Gilbert, 2005; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Osiyevskyy & 
Dewald, 2015).  
Organizational routines are key characteristics in organization identity (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985). Identity reflects members’ sensemaking of “who we are as an organization” and 
“what we do as a collective” (Nag, Corley & Gioia, 2007). Too sense of strong organizational 
identity can restrict ability in adapting organizational capability to changing environments 
(Kogut & Zander, 1996), especially when a benign or munificent environment not only delays 
recognition of the need for change but also slows or prevents the development of alternative 
models (Barr et al. 1992; Hedberg & Jonsson, 1977). Inertia becomes so habitual that the 
changing nature of the reality being faced is not acknowledged, even when ‘extinction’ is 
threatened (Miller & Friesen, 1980, p. 591). When strategy is increasingly out of kilter with the 
environment, the sensemaking of the top management team, which interprets the organization’s 
environment, makes strategic choices, and monitors the results of those choices, is crucial 
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(Bluedorn et al., 1994, p. 203). Strategic leadership becomes particularly important during 
turnaround periods (Trahms et al., 2013) when  top executives, whose sensemaking now seems 
to have been erroneous, will need to be strategically changed (Bluedorn et al., 1994). Such cases 
can easily be found in declining industries: for instance, new leadership at NCR changed the 
organization’s capabilities (Rosenbloom, 2000). As argued by Barr et al. (1992), top managers’ 
need to keep pace with changing environments and translate their sensemaking into the creation 
of innovative and appropriate capabilities. Capability acquisition can occur through redeploying 
prior managerial experience consciously or unconsciously to create new routines to bear upon a 
problem (Miner, Gong, Baker & O’Toole, 2011) or, as Lavie (2006) suggests, by learning from 
other firms via mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures or inter-firm alliances, or bringing new sets 
of knowledge and skills into the organization through new hires. Reconfiguration of existing 
knowledge bases supports incumbency while creating new routines and capabilities often puts 
incumbents at a disadvantage (Methé et al., 1997).   
We turn now to a case of renewal in one of the most traditional of industries, in order to 
explore strategies for success in the face of an organization that nearly became extinct. 
THE INDUSTRY CONTEXT AND RADICAL INNOVATIONS: STOPPER WARS 
Records of the myriad uses of cork exist over at least two millennia. Cork is produced from the 
outer bark of an evergreen type of oak tree called the cork oak (species Quercus suber), native to 
the Mediterranean region. Cork consists of the irregularly shaped, thin-walled, wax-coated cells 
that make up the bark of the cork oak. Cork is obtained from the new outer sheath of bark formed 
by the inner bark after the original rough outer bark is removed. The outer sheath may then be 
stripped and will form again; hence, it is referred to as regenerative cork. Repeated stripping of 
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cork is possible because the inner bark of the cork oak develops an especially uniform and 
continuous regenerative tissue. Unlike the inner bark, the outer bark of cork is not vital to the 
tree’s survival; it is a protective aid against heat and dry winds. Stripping this regenerated layer 
yields commercial cork slabs of air-filled cells, each of which consists of a watertight, flexible 
compartment. En masse, these cells constitute a medium impervious to liquids. Ancient Greeks 
and Egyptians used cork stoppers to seal their amphorae, which subsequently became the major 
commercial use of the plant. In terms of present day global cork production, Portugal and Spain 
account for more than 50% and 25%, respectively. 
The development of the modern cork industry can be traced to the French Benedictine 
monk Dom Pierre Pérignon, who developed the production of champagne around 1680. Wooden 
stoppers wrapped in hemp and soaked with olive oil that often popped out had been used to seal 
sparkling wine containers. Pérignon obtained much better results when he tested cork as an 
alternative. Soon cork became an essential stopper and by the turn of the twentieth century, 
almost all wine and champagne bottles had cork closures, an overwhelming dominance that 
would remain till the early 1990s. Capsulated cork, which is a natural cork stopper with a range 
of different caps in plastic, wood and other materials, designed for bottling fortified wines and 
spirits, has also been developed to provide an efficient seal and easy manual extraction, used for 
wines meant for repeated subsequent re-use, such as Port, one of the bases of Portugal’s 
substantial wine trade.  
Having been the stopper of choice over the last few centuries, cork’s dominance had been 
taken for granted, both by the wine and the cork stopper industries. An unpleasant awakening for 
the cork industry came in the 1980s, with the discovery of the reason behind a condition known 
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as cork taint. Recognized under various names, cork taint provoked a chemical reaction with the 
cork stopper, leading to wine contamination with the chemical compound, 2,4,6-Trichloroanisole 
(TCA). TCA was a particular problem for wine, causing it to become insipid and change flavor, 
leading the wine to become corked. The costs of poor quality cork closures can be very high: 
besides damaging expensive wine, contaminated cork also can ruin the reputation of the wine 
label.  
The problem of cork taint had been known for a very long time; however, the cork 
industry denied cork was the cause, censuring the wine industry instead in a blame culture 
hampering the ability to detect and correct errors (Catino & Patriotta, 2013). After Hans Tanner, 
in 1981, first identified the TCA compound as causing ‘an unpleasant, musty off-flavour [that] 
can render an otherwise excellent wine completely useless’ (Buser, Zenier & Tanner, 1982, p. 
359), the industry could no longer deny responsibility. Cork’s days seemed numbered: a mock 
funeral for cork was held in New York City on October 2, 2002, led by some members of the 
California wine community. The end of the cork stopper seemed imminent. 
Radical Innovation: the rise of alternative stoppers 
Failure of the cork industry to respond effectively to TCA provided a boost to industry 
alternatives. Although the scientific linkage of wine spoilage with cork via TCA had been made 
a decade earlier, the first real challenge to natural cork stoppers came from emerging radical 
technological innovations – synthetic closures – only in the early 1990s. These were alternative 
stoppers molded from synthetics of either medical or food grade plastics, designed much like 
cork stoppers. Given their production process, synthetics are naturally TCA free, uniform in 
terms of quality, and neutral in terms of affecting the taste of wine. Synthetic stoppers quickly 
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gained a following among wineries alarmed by the discovery of TCA in natural cork stoppers. 
However, plastic stoppers are not infallible, as they tend to get stuck in the neck of the bottle 
after a few months or years of storage (Patterson, 2010). Another problem is permeability, when 
wines kept for some time are exposed to the influence of oxygen infiltrating through the 
synthetic stopper, a problem confirmed in a study conducted in 1999 by the Australian Wine 
Research Institute (AWRI). Synthetics producers have been trying to resolve both these 
problems by reformulating their materials to reduce permeability.  
 Aluminum screw caps have emerged in recent years as the most significant threat to cork 
closures. Following the acceptance of their screw cap closure for spirits, liqueurs and aperitifs, in 
1959 the French manufacturer Le Bouchage Mecanique (L.B.M.) developed a quality table wine 
closure to replace the cork stopper. The company named it “Stelvin,” claiming it to be at least 
comparable, and in many respects superior, to the traditional cork product. The screw caps were 
made of aluminum, were corrosion resistant, and had a treated, chemically inert wad facing the 
wine (Mortensen & Marks, 2003). The alternative stoppers were cheaper than natural cork: a 
natural cork stopper costs between $0.30 and $2.4, whereas synthetic rivals are priced between 
$0.18 and $0.50 (Hatton, 2011). Wine bottles with alternative closures are also simpler to open, 
as they do not require a corkscrew. From a customer perspective, this could be seen as a “no-
faff” advantage.  
No single global source collates data on bottle stoppers but estimates reveal that up to the 
beginning of 1990, cork had close to a 97% market share (information from an industry insider 
interviewed in the course of the study). That share dropped to 70% a decade later. Therefore, the 
alternative stoppers served as a substitute to cork, representing radical technological innovation 
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from the point of view of cork producers. For a growing number of existing wine makers they 
were a preferred substitute. As such they cannibalized existing products, destroying existing 
cork-based competencies as technical capabilities (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Ansari & Krop, 
2012). Near the end of the twentieth century, the cork industry leader, COR, seemed well on its 
way toward organizational extinction, as ‘a substantial, absolute decrease in [the] resource base 
occurs over a specified period of time’ (Cameron et al. 1987: 224). COR fought back – and it is 
this retaliation that forms the basis for our research case. The case provides a relatively thick 
description of how an industry veteran confronted existential threat of extinction from radical 
innovation (Siggelkow, 2007). Next, we discuss how we conducted the research before moving 
to a discussion of the findings. 
METHOD 
Case justification 
The uniqueness of COR justifies its choice as an exemplar case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). COR is the 
single largest cork stopper manufacturer in the world, accounting for 4 billion units of the global 
production of around 13 billion cork stoppers. COR is also leading the industry fight-back 
against alternative closures; hence it is easy to defend the choice of the firm precisely because 
it’s centrality and size make it special, allowing one to gain certain insights that other 
organizations would not be able to provide. The second largest cork stopper player – Oeneo – 
enjoys less than half of COR’s global market share. in researching this exemplar case we follow 
the lead of some influential single case studies that explore incumbent response to new 
technologies (Burgelman, 1991, 1994; Danneels, 2011; Rosenbloom, 2000; Sull, 1999; Tripsas 
& Gavetti, 2000). We use a longitudinal single-case study, highly appropriate for theory 
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generation that exploits ‘opportunities to explore a significant phenomenon under rare or extreme 
circumstances’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p.27). The case study method has the added 
“advantage of enabling the researcher to study a phenomenon in a real-life setting where often it 
would be otherwise difficult to grasp its dimensions” (Runfola et al., 2016; p. 2).  
Data Collection 
Data collection followed the principle of triangulation along the lines proposed by Flick (2004), 
who argued that multiple sources of information would lead to more robust findings, supporting 
construct validity. The first step was to collect information and data from publicly available 
sources, such as company websites, newspaper articles, industry journals, annual company 
reports, and trade statistics. Information was also gathered during an industry conference held in 
Portugal in April of 2011, which saw a gathering of experts, entrepreneurs, trade body 
representatives, as well as senior personnel from different Portuguese cork manufacturers. The 
documentary data collection process started in March of 2011, three months before our first 
interviews, which prepared us for the field visits.  
The primary data source consisted of interviews carried out with key personnel involved 
in the fightback strategy of the firm, as well as industry representatives. We used multiple highly 
knowledgeable informants, enabling us to view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives. 
Using this approach limited the probability of convergent retrospective sensemaking and 
impression management (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 28). First, we had a half hour 
telephone interview with a member of the administrative board of COR (June 3rd, 2011). The 
objective was to glean preliminary information on organizational strategy and to prepare for site 
interviews. Additionally, this interview helped COR to understand our research goals and needs, 
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a necessary legitimation process.  
Second, exploratory and semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten key 
employees at company installations. All of those interviewed held senior positions either in the 
cork company (COR) or in the cork stopper business unit, with direct knowledge and 
involvement in COR’s market recovery strategy. On average the interviews lasted 50 minutes (a 
total of close to 22 hours of personal interviews), with extensive written notes taken. The two 
interviews with the CEO of COR were tape-recorded on digital audio files; other interviews were 
not recorded. Interviews were held at least twice, and included four separate meetings with 
António Reis Amorim (ArA), the CEO of COR, who spearheaded and actively coordinated the 
response and growth strategies (the last interview was performed on 03/17/2015). To gain an 
industry (“outside firm”) perspective, we interviewed Joaquím Lima, head of APCOR, the 
Portuguese cork trade association, which counts among its members more than half of all the 
cork stopper manufacturers, including all the large firms. All interviews were conducted 
separately, each lasting between a half hour to two hours.  
Supplementing the research-generated data gathered through interviews, we collected 
substantial amounts of naturally occurring data (Silverman, 2011). During three afternoons at 
COR’s R&D laboratory (June/2011, July/2011 and December/2014), where various tests for 
TCA detection were demonstrated, we generated substantial field notes. In addition, over the 
course of the study we were given extensive access to the company’s secondary data regarding 
the firm itself s well as the cork-stopper industry, including internal reports, meeting notes and 
business memos. The company-provided secondary data was supplemented with additional 
information from public sources.  Overall, approximately half of the archival evidence was in the 
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form of annual reports of COR and other documents from COR, while the rest consisted of 
books (including two on COR’s history), newspaper and journal articles. Finally a draft of this 
paper was e-mailed to COR for internal circulation among those who participated in the study, in 
order to verify the accuracy of data and findings (Danneels 2011; Hirschman, 1986; Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). 
During the four years of data collection and analysis, more than seven thousand pages of 
text were collected, read and analyzed. Around two-thirds of these documents, including 
company reports, were in English, with the remainder in Portuguese. In data analysis priority has 
been given to themes emerging from the primary data sources (interviews and field notes). 
Secondary data served a different purpose, namely corroborating the evidence gathered from the 
primary data. In particular, the secondary data was used to provide evidence regarding: (a)  an 
historical perspective on COR; (b) the state and dynamics of the industry, technology and the 
threat from alternative stoppers and (c), COR’s product range expansion and sales evolution. 
Besides providing both a historical and contemporary perspective, the archival data helped 
strengthen construct validity and minimize the risk of overly subjective judgments being made 
from the primary data. The entire data collection process followed the principle of construct 
validation, seeking different angles from which to look at the same phenomenon, by using 
different data collection strategies and different data sources (Gibbert et al., 2008).  
Data Analysis 
Similar to the approach taken by other scholars analyzing organizational responses in the face of 
external threats from new technologies (Danneels, 2011; Rosenbloom, 2000), we used the 
extended case method (Burawoy, 1991) to guide the data analysis. Extended case study is not 
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intended to build new theory but rather refine and extend extant theory. While pure grounded 
theory method seeks to build new theory, the extended case method treats ‘phenomena not as 
instances of some potential new theory but as counter instances of some old theory’ (Burawoy, 
1991, p. 9). The case of COR is aptly suited for extended case analysis “where instead of an 
exemplar the social situation is viewed as an anomaly” (Burawoy, 1991, p. 9), in that the firm 
was successful in combating decline induced by radical innovations, by initiating strategic 
alliances, appropriating new technology (either buying or developing its own), absorbing and 
integrating new technology with that already existing.  
Using the extended case method enabled us to integrate concepts and theories to explain 
how COR responded to the alternate stoppers challenge. We began by creating an event history 
database (Van de Ven & Poole, 1990), chronologically ordering descriptions of events. A 
narrative, derived from interview and field notes, newspaper and journal accounts, books, and 
company reports, was developed. The data analysis followed an iterative process, coherent with 
Edmendson and McManus’ (2007, p. 1155) suggestion of methodological fit in management 
field research as “created through an iterative learning process that requires a mindset in which 
feedback, rethinking, and revising are embraced as valued activities, and to discuss the 
implications of this for educating new field researchers.” In keeping with Burawoy´s (1991) 
suggestion of theory reconstruction, we conducted two running exchanges between field notes 
and the consequent analysis. The first running exchange involved uncovering anomalies between 
extant theories of how incumbents succeed when confronted by radical innovations and the data 
that emerged from document analysis and field studies. In conjunction, the second running 
exchange was between data collection and existing theory.  
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The themes that emerged were based on commonly used statements, for instance multiple 
data segments referring to ‘we became complacent’ ‘we have grown for so long, and we would 
continue to do so’, ‘monopoly’, ‘wake up call’, ‘house in order’, suggesting domain neglect. This 
process was highly iterative (Locke, 2001), necessitating cycling between the data and extant 
theory, with the data suggesting relevant concepts and theories in the literature, while the 
literature provided conceptual frameworks to aid in the interpretation of the data (Danneels, 
2011). Theoretically we drew from literature on capabilities, resource allocations and managerial 
cognition. As we gradually discovered pathways through the data, subsequent meetings 
specifically probed questions related to these, such as top management’s mental models. After 
four years of extensive reading of interview transcripts, articles and company reports, data 
saturation was reached when little headway was being made with respect to additional themes or 
new explanations (Morse, 1995). In what follows, juxtaposing data against theory (Orton, 1997), 
we describe how and why COR is managing, with increasing success, to maintain its leadership 
position in the stopper market while remaining faithful to its 150-year-old history and tradition 
with cork, thriving in the face of what had seemed likely extinction.  
THE FIRM: CORTICEIRA AMORIM (COR) 
The genesis of COR lies in the establishment of a small cork workshop in Vila Nova de Gaia, by 
António Alves Amorim in 1880. Amorim’s intention was to take advantage of the port wine 
trade that plied along the river Douro in this northern coastal part of Portugal. Following a fallout 
with his financial partner, in 1908 Amorim moved with his family to Santa Maria de Lamas, his 
wife’s birthplace, around fifteen miles south of Vila Nova. With the continuous growth of the 
family business, a purpose-built factory was constructed in 1922 and the cork firm was officially 
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incorporated. Over the next six decades the company continued to grow, especially under the 
leadership of a third generation family member, Américo Amorim. Over the years, the profits 
generated by the cork stopper business permitted the firm to evolve into a diversified 
conglomerate called Amorim Investimentos e Participações (AIP), with six sub-holdings. The 
non-cork sub-holdings involved diversified businesses including tourism, real estate, insurance, 
textiles and banking as well as financial interests ranging from oil to casinos. However, the cork 
sub-holding, Corticeira Amorim (COR), remains the largest revenue producer and the crown 
jewel of the group. 
COR is organized in five business units, each developing its own products and brands, 
employing over three thousand workers. The raw materials unit is in charge of the management 
of all aspects of purchasing, storage and preparation of the common denominator of the firm, 
cork. The heart and soul of the firm, however, is Amorim & Irmãos (AI), the cork stopper 
business unit, with a share of almost 60% of group sales. Dwarfing the other four business units, 
A&I has eight industrial units, while the overall cork business, COR, has 28 industrial units (of 
which 17 are in Portugal). The total revenues of COR were around $714 million in 2014 (up 
from $650 million in 2013).  
FINDINGS 
COR was unable to stem the rise of alternative stoppers, or effectively counter cork’s negative 
image from the TCA fallout in the 1990s: why was this? Despite possessing slack resources, 
there existed little deliberate and systematic effort at process innovations to reduce 
contamination at this time. Intriguingly, COR’s response did not involve absorbing or adopting 
alternative stopper technology. In what follows, we trace, through a series of stages, how top 
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management’s cognition was variously implicated in the development of capabilities and their 
deployment in shaping strategy and, consequently, organizational performance, which are 
summarized in the inductively developed a process model (Langley, 1999) of capability 
enhancement, presented in Figure 1. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Stage 1: Rigidity caused by denial (1990s) 
The capabilities and resources of COR evolved over a century and a half, based on extensive 
experience in sourcing, manufacturing and connecting with global clients. Incrementally 
constructed routines, knowledge and assets steadily and predictably delivered favorable 
organizational outcome over decades for the market leader in a monopoly industry. Profits from 
cork stoppers enabled COR to expand into a host of areas ranging from hotels to oil, making its 
third generation family owner and CEO, Américo Amorim, among the richest men in the world 
(Forbes, 2015). 
Prior to the establishment of a scientific connection between cork and wine spoilage in 
the 1980s, the cork and the wine industry (the latter reluctantly) implicitly assumed that a small 
percentage of wine would be “naturally” spoiled. The detection of TCA in cork, most of whose 
presence was derived from the then existing practices of extracting, transporting, and 
manufacturing cork, unambiguously established causality. TCA detection created the opening for 
competition, with a Seattle based company, Supremecorq, offering the first credible alternative 
to the market in 1994. 
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Increasingly negative coverage from the wine industry media, along with clientele 
increasingly reluctant to go along with cork industry excuses, provided clear pointers that the 
competitive environment was changing. However, it is the “ability to translate … insights into 
changes in the organization” that determines effective strategic action. The failure to act 
effectively and resolve contamination undermined the cork stopper’s fundamental capability— 
the specific and intended “purpose” (Helfat & Winter, 2011) – to provide a quality closure that 
did not spoil wine. Some established clients of COR began to abandon cork for alternative 
products emerging by the mid-1990s as alternatives, leading to a steady erosion of the firm’s 
market share, first due to plastic stoppers, increasingly from screw caps.  
Encoding experience 
At COR, routines were reinforced by three dynamics — the continuous success of COR, 
familiarity with processes ranging from procurement to distribution, and regularity of 
experiences. These three behavioral mechanisms enabled encoding of experiences into routines 
over the decades. Routines are based on interpretations of the past (Levitt & March, 1988), of 
which COR had a rich history. For more than a century, the firm had built up a trusted and 
established network of raw material and a large distribution system with local presence in all the 
important markets. These routines generated capabilities effectively deployed to generate profits 
over the years in every aspect of the organization. 
Problem sensing  
The process of transforming and assimilating information into knowledge and understanding 
determines management’s chosen strategic options in given environments. In the face of a 
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changing environment, any effective strategic action toward organizational renewal could 
happen only when salient negative changes in performance were detected, recognized and 
interpreted as permanent downturns (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). Initially slow to react because  
“Everyone was conscious of the problem, with the exception of the monopoly cork 
industry. It’s easy for everyone in a business to ignore an issue if there is no competition. 
At the end of the 1980s, cork was still the only available closure for quality wines or 
wines that had aspirations of quality. Low-tier wines might not be in a bottle with a cork, 
but that was the commodity market where only price mattered” (Taber, 2007, p. 59). 
In essence, there was a deficit in problem sensing, ‘the cognitive processes of noticing and 
constructing meaning about environmental change so that organizations can take action’ (Kiesler 
& Sproull, 1982, p. 548). The problem of market decline was not initially made sense of as 
something that could be permanent, calling for additional resource allocation; existing 
capabilities were largely maintained and while some measures to reduce contamination were put 
in place they did not represent clear and comprehensive innovation. 
Matching capabilities to threats  
The CEO’s interpretive schema at the time the threat emerged shaped scarce resource allocation 
and capability deployment. Three important factors slowed COR’s inability to adapt or 
reconfigure organizational capabilities to the changing environmental conditions. First, COR had 
grown into a conglomerate from its base in the cork industry. While cork stoppers were, and 
remained, the jewel in the crown, they had enabled investments into multiple and varied areas, 
creating a problem of attention deficit (Ocasio, 1997, p.188): “What decision makers do depends 
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on what issues and answers they focus their attention on.” Attention was not focused 
unequivocally on the changes and threats to the cork-stopper industry.   
Second, an increasing market preference for wine, with a steady rise in wine consumption 
since 1990, masked cork’s decline. While the market share of cork was declining COR was 
selling over three times more in 2000 than it had in 1990, due in large part to the increase in wine 
sales in Australia and the USA. Growth in sales hid “a multitude of sins” (Barr et al, 1992) and 
the strong demand for cork in the mid-1990s reduced the sense of urgency to create or 
reconfigure capabilities to counter the threat developing from alternative wine-closers.  
COR’s organizational identity was a third factor inhibiting sensemaking in an 
increasingly negative environment marked by bad press and a rise in market share of alternative 
stoppers. Over thirteen decades of experience and knowledge had created a very strong sense of 
organizational identity at COR, an identity forged by cork. COR and cork were a unity. The 
sense of “who we are” as an organization was based on working with this single material, and 
this shaped management’s interpretation of external (negative) information. COR could not 
change the organization without changing its identity.  
COR’s belief and faith in cork was so strong that, in the past, the possibility of the natural 
material being contaminated was not seriously considered. After the 1981 discovery of TCA, the 
company believed that, even if the problem really existed, it would eventually be resolved, a 
belief that was so embedded in the organization’s culture that it inhibited a more objective and 
critical analysis of the TCA problem, corroborating the identity-based inertial processes pointed 
out by Tripsas (2009). Identity-challenging radical innovations are usually not embraced for two 
reasons: first, organizational identity functions as cognitive filters through which organizational 
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members notice and interpret information; second, identity and organizational routines are so 
intertwined that non-cognition occurs. These factors characterized COR’s initial reactions in the 
1990s. 
Denial as the mother of rigidity 
The consequence of COR’s inability to adapt organizational capabilities to the threat from 
alternative stoppers led to a scenario in which “denial was the mother of rigidity,” leading to an 
outcome similar to the “necessity as the mother of rigidity” perspective (Mone et al., 1998; Staw 
et al., 1981; McKinley et al., 2014). The existence of a real long-term problem was denied. In 
the face of the external threat posed by alternative stoppers, COR restricted information 
processing and continued to rely on well-embedded routines without investing in innovation. 
Limited innovation experience restricted the organizational memory of top management. Having 
been in a monopoly industry, with no substitute competitors for so long, few new capabilities 
were developed, with the accumulated history playing a significant inertial role with respect to 
routines (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). Tradition trumped innovation. Moreover, in the perception 
of the top management team of the COR (as an industry leader) the ‘TCA’ and ‘radical 
innovations’ problems were insufficiently salient to recognize errors in established courses of 
action from which they could learn (Catino & Patriotta, 2013). 
Refusing to acknowledge the problem, a bunker mentality characterized the organization. 
Taber (2007) argues that denial of TCA contamination by the cork industry played a central part 
in the rise of alternative stoppers. Influential wine journalists long lamented the industry’s refusal 
to admit that cork could be the cause of wine spoilage. Journalist Tom Cannavan (2008), 
observed: 
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There was almost a denial that the problem existed, with cork producers seemingly 
putting more money into PR than research, claiming other faults were being wrongly 
attributed to cork, criticizing other closures, claiming the statistics were all wrong and 
generally sticking their collective heads in the sand. 
Domain neglect 
COR’s top management pursued a strategy which could be termed as “domain negligence”: they 
criticized the qualities of alternative stoppers, blaming TCA on wine producers’ bad storage, 
while engaging in public relations. Management reinforced rigidity through perpetuation of 
already established routines (e.g., McKinley et al., 2014). COR’s efforts at tackling 
contamination were perfunctory rather than a deliberate medium-term strategy. Looking back (in 
an indirect criticism of his uncle), the former CEO told us:  
You cannot criticize your competition without first having your house in order. We didn't 
have our house in order.1  
On COR’s domain neglect, Taber (2007) states:   
For a long time…especially when plastic first came on, they tried to dismiss it and say 
“This is a crazy thing … no one is going to ever change to it and…” — but as they 
started to lose market share, they definitely started to react. They are very fortunate that 
a new generation of leadership came into the largest company. 
Triggering Event: Leadership Change  
                                                          
1 When we quote respondents, the source is our written notes made during the interviews. 
 25
During the course of the 1990s, the principal shareholders of the family-owned company 
gradually realized that unless the TCA problem was dealt with effectively, disruption from 
alternative closures was imminent. As Daryl Eklund, the former general manager for Amorim 
Cork America wryly noted (cited from Patterson, 2010): 
For people in the industry, it took a big mindset change. Nothing changes a mindset like 
losing a third of your market, which happened with the rise of synthetic corks in the 
1990s.  
The board´s position at the end of the twentieth century reflected Ford and Baucus’ (1987, p. 
366) suggestion, that ‘only after prolonged decline precipitated changes in top management was 
"weathering the storm" abandoned and "unlearning yesterday" and "inventing tomorrow" 
embraced.’ 
In 2001, the group’s patriarch, Américo Amorim, decided formally to hand over the reins 
of the cork company to his thirty-three year old nephew, Antonio Rios Amorim (ArA). After 
taking over the cork stopper division as its managing director in 1997 he had already initiated 
some anti-contamination measures and introduced a new stopper type called Twin Tops, which 
was a technical cork stopper, made of agglomerated cork with a disc of natural cork at either end.  
Stage 2: Capability Renewal (necessity as the mother of invention: since 2001) 
Thirty-four year old ArA’s cognition was quite different from that of his octogenarian uncle. 
With a very international outlook and education, he was well aware of the Schumpeterian forces 
of creative destruction. Educated in commerce from the University of Birmingham, with 
executive management programs from Columbia University, INSEAD (in France) and Stanford 
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University, his business sophistication combined with in-depth knowledge of the firm and 
industry played an important role in his sensemaking. 
Interpreting purpose  
Asked about the generational management transition, ArA summarized his thoughts on that 
period: 
When I took over, we could have done nothing and milked the stopper cash cow, but then 
we would have been out of business in fifteen years. I knew that we had to do something. 
The new CEO had interpreted the future very clearly—if cork couldn’t get rid of, or substantially 
reduce the presence of TCA, then there would be no future for the organization, at least as it 
existed. Existing routines had been constructed over decades of success but a changing 
environment required a “mindful” creation of new routines (Salvato, 2009). ArA was very 
attentive to cues from the recent past: 
For some years I worked as my uncle’s translator whenever there were English-speaking 
clients. I would also travel with him, and this gave me direct exposure to the unhappiness 
and problems of our clients.  
In such early experience the wine industry’s distress was forcefully conveyed to ArA, providing 
compelling cues to shape new routines: 
I had the worst meeting in my life sometime in early 2000, when Cabral and I (the newly 
appointed R&D head) had a meeting in Adelaide with Australian wine producing 
companies. For almost six hours we were under constant attack from them over the 
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contamination issue. After it was over, I told Cabral that I don’t want a repeat of this 
experience. I don’t care what it costs: just fix this problem.  
To handle the emerging crisis, ArA chose to enhance existing technology: 
I knew that we had to first do our own homework, rather than criticize the alternatives, 
because each of these alternatives has its defects… I realized that the change has to come 
through technology, during a visit from an Australian, whom I took to Alentejo from 
where we source most of our cork. There, in front of the visitor, two people gave two 
contradictory views on the impact of sun on cork. I realized then that there has to be 
serious research behind our approach.  
An essential component in the construction of routines to create capabilities is to identify the 
purpose (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). ArA’s sense of impending crisis provided him with that 
purpose. COR, essentially, was a one-trick pony whose success had rendered the firm billions of 
dollars over the years. It was evident that this pony was about to die, unless new capabilities that 
could eliminate the contamination problem were innovated. 
COR was seeking incremental exploitative change, derived from a “problemistic search” 
which, in a case of bounded rationality, was local and close to existing practices (Osiyevskyy & 
Dewald, 2015). A change of this order implied the enhancement of existing capabilities along 
established paths. Facing the threat posed by reducing market share and loss of important clients, 
ArA sought to build new capabilities aimed at reducing contamination instead of reinforcing 
existing routines. Faced with a “loss context” (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), innovation was 
stimulated. As ArA mentioned: 
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The contamination issue was the best thing that happened to us in the long term. It was a 
good kick up the bottom -- no doubt about it. In the last 10 years, the cork industry 
understood that it was being challenged. I believe it [realization and action] was bound 
to happe, but what accelerated it were these plastics and synthetics and alternative 
closures. We in the cork industry had to speed things up and I think we did that. We must 
not become complacent. 
Understanding COR’s capabilities  
Assembly of new routines into capabilities requires explicit cognizance of organizational skills 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). ArA’s direct supervision of the stopper business from 1997 and prior 
to that his experience within the group’s hotel division and real estate, meant that he was well 
aware of the organization’s resources and capabilities. Being an insider, he was well versed in 
the routines, skills, and capabilities of the cork organization and industry. 
Assembling new routines for new competencies 
Being a market leader with the best technological practices in the industry reduced the options 
open to COR in the form of acquisitions or joint ventures for learning new technology from 
within the industry. Outsiders have been found instrumental in helping the incumbents’ top 
management to interpret the new knowledge appropriately (Kammerlander, 2013). COR’s chose 
to hire outside expertise, Miguel Cabral, a Professor of Microbiology from Porto University, to 
head the R&D division of COR. Cabral´s mandate was clear from the beginning— resolve the 
TCA problem.  
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The series of process innovations to reduce the incidence and increase detection of TCA 
(outlined with technical details in the Appendix) were based on new routines derived from the 
work of Cabral and his team of researchers. One new routine involved sourcing the raw material. 
Many raw cork suppliers were vertically integrated to afford much greater quality control over 
the raw material for cork stoppers. When ArA took control of the company COR produced only 
25 percent of the raw cork it used. After suppliers were purchased selectively, that figure rose to 
95 percent by 2014. COR provided extensive technical training to employees involving the 
cutting of the cork bark from the oak (to reduce the possibility of contamination), as well as 
offering financial incentives to compensate for any eventual loss to the farmers derived from 
these new methods. 
Domain defense  
First sensemaking then strategic action, following the interpretation of a situation. ArA’s strategy 
from the start was to recover lost market share and reputation. After assuming the helm of COR, 
he launched a careful and deliberate decontamination strategy. An integral part of domain 
defense strategy is creating awareness and ArA and other senior management, including the 
R&D chief Cabral, regularly make presentations at wine industry events, clients’ offices, and 
international scientific conferences, both as evangelists of cork and with the purpose of learning 
new trends and consumer preferences.  
COR’s strategy, pursued after 2001, aimed at securing market position. Typical of 
domain defense, efforts were geared at preserving and restoring legitimacy and at preventing 
further encroachment on market share (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985; Ford & Baucus, 1987; 
McKinley et al., 2014). The innovations discussed earlier (and in the Appendix), including 
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changing of sourcing practices, were integral to domain defense as was creating new cork 
stopper types. ArA argued: 
We can do more from the viewpoint of process than had been done so far, and improve. 
From the technological viewpoint, we can extract the raw material in a more efficient 
manner and use ever more sophisticated methods to produce cork stoppers, relying less 
on labor. We can develop new products and thereby become more competitive. 
In the first phase we did our homework. Before, in the early 2000s we only had promises. 
Once we showed improvements in performance (meaning TCA reduction), we were more 
comfortable with thinking of new products. 
An integral part of the sensemaking process involved active and continuous listening to 
customers. Illustrative of the new domain defense strategy was the launching in 2015 of a twist-
off, re-sealable wine cork that doesn't need a corkscrew, called the Helix. Developed in 
partnership with the largest bottle manufacturer in the world, Owens-Illinois, the Helix combines 
an ergonomically designed cork stopper and a glass bottle with an internal thread in the neck. 
ArA explained the origins of the Helix, launched after four years of development: 
A US client of ours did a market survey of the consumer experience with opening a bottle 
of wine. They found that clients preferred cork stoppers, and with regards to screw caps 
they felt frustrated because they believed they were being ripped off. Clients found screw 
caps cheaper, yet “convenient.” We believe that especially for the countries that are 
beginning to have a greater tradition and culture of wine drinking, “convenience” would 
be very important. We asked ourselves: How can we give more convenience than we can 
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give today? How can we give the same convenience as screw caps? That was how Helix 
started. 
The introduction of the Helix was an implicit attempt at ‘disrupting the disruptor’ (Markides & 
Oyon, 2010), by coming out with a solution tailored to COR’s competencies, yet matching a 
rival technology’s strength in an important dimension. Helix follows earlier new cork stoppers 
introduced by COR, such as the Neutrocork, which, Miguel Cabral notes, has a zero incidence of 
TCA, and Twin Top (introduced when ArA ran the cork stopper division in 1997), both being 
individually moulded cork, made of fine cork granules and intended for wines bottled within two 
years of production. A more recent strategy has been to target high-end segment cork stoppers 
and regions with higher growth prospects, namely the US and China. 
Performance Outcome: Arresting Decline 
The domain defense seems to be bearing fruit: even though the alternative technologies have not 
been thwarted, important indicators point to slowing momentum in alternative stoppers, 
especially plastics. The series of process innovations undertaken since the beginning of the 
century (see the Appendix) have had the effect of reducing the incidence of TCA for corks by a 
factor of ten. Miguel Cabral is confident that the new detection machines that individually 
identify TCA incidence will bring TCA rates down to 0.5% for natural cork stoppers, a rate 
which already exists for COR’s technical stoppers such as Neutrocork. COR also played an 
important role in selectively revealing some of their technology to uplift industry standards 
(Sarkar, 2016). 
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Recent years have seen COR registering strong growth, with revenues from cork stoppers 
close to €393 million in 2015, an increase of almost 45% over five years. In the first semester of 
2016, there was a rise in the volume of sales by 9%. In 2015, COR increased its annual 
investment in R&D from annually around five million euros to seven million (Sarkar, 2016).  
Meanwhile, some of the largest competitors in the alternative closure industry are under 
pressure. One of the largest synthetic stopper makers, NuKorc of Australia, founded in 1996, has 
filed for bankruptcy; another huge synthetic stopper manufacturer, the American Supremecorq 
founded in 1992, also filed for bankruptcy in 2011. For the very important US retail market, 
studies of restaurant sales by Wine & Spirits magazine point to the decline of synthetic and screw 
cap wine closures, with a corresponding increase in the growth of cork stoppers. Cork closures 
accounted for 90% of wine bottles, an increase of 21%over the past decade, while screw caps 
and synthetics decreased at the rates of 39% and 70%, respectively. Carlos de Jesus (the head of 
Marketing at COR) emphasizing the importance of these results, noted:  
The U.S. is now the world's biggest wine market. These figures are even more relevant if 
we consider that the USA has a great potential for growth in the per capita consumption 
of wine. 
The overall COR group ended the 2014 fiscal year with a net profit of € 35.8 million, a 
near 20% increase over the previous year. Cork stoppers recorded a new sales increase of around 
7% in value and nearly 5% in quantity, selling over 4 billion cork stoppers. The Helix cork is 
now available in wine bottles in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, with a very good reception 
from the wine industry. Cautious optimism is evident in the organization, even compared to 
2011, when the research started.  
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DISCUSSION 
Capability Enhancement in Response to Radical Innovation: An Emerging Process Model 
Three distinct factors favored COR in its battle against alternative stoppers: (1) correctly 
interpreting the (unfavorable) environment after two decades of denial; (2) new leadership with 
concentration of powers that permitted the necessary change, and (3) engagement in an effective 
domain defense strategy.  
The first research question related to the possibility of successful responses by an 
incumbent in arresting the momentum of radical innovations in their industries. The struggle of 
incumbents responding to radical technological innovation (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) does not 
imply incumbent inevitable decline. Our analysis demonstrated the effectiveness of one of the 
possible response strategies, implying capability enhancement to extend the performance of 
existing technology along an established trajectory. The analysis also provides particular details 
regarding the actions taken by the established company to enhance its existing capabilities: (a) 
emphasizing R&D to resolve the initial problem, (b) initiating process innovations, (c) 
integrating vertically, and, finally, (d) developing new products stemming from the existing 
technology. 
The second research question related to the cognitive processes within an incumbent 
company that facilitate the emergence of a successful response strategy. Analyzing the COR case 
through the lens of managerial cognition as sensemaking, we inductively developed a process 
model of capability enhancement, presented in Figure 1. The chart illustrates the 
interconnections between capabilities and managerial cognition along the three stages of rigidity, 
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triggering events, and capability renewal. The research uncovered how dynamics of cognition 
were variously implicated in the development of capabilities and their deployment in shaping 
strategy.  
The initial pre-crisis period covered the company’s thirteen decades of successful 
experience and market leadership with existing technology whose longevity is found in very few 
industries; not surprisingly, the technology of dealing with natural cork was deeply engrained in 
the company’s identity and routines. As a result of this tradition, COR was insensitive to changes 
in the industry in the late 1980s, comprising customers’ growing concerns about cork taint, nor 
was it cognizant of threats from rival technologies, some with performance parameters superior 
to cork. Consequently, in the first stage in Figure 1’s process model – Rigidity – the 
organizational decision makers did not sense an emerging problem. In particular, the gradual loss 
of market share was interpreted as temporary, not leading to either creation of new routines or 
reconfiguration of existing capabilities to tackle the TCA threat. Alternatives were not perceived 
as a long-term threat, leading to a domain negligence that allowed alternatives to gain market 
share. In this “denial as the mother of rigidity” stage, the firm restricted information processing, 
relying on well-embedded routines, with little in the way of resources invested in innovation.  
The leap from Stage 1 (Rigidity) to Stage 2 (Capability Renewal) was mediated by a 
triggering event: leadership change. A crumbling industry image, rising momentum of 
alternative stoppers, declining market share and direct exposure to an unhappy wine industry 
were potent cues to ArA, as early as 1997, that changes were needed. Assuming company 
leadership in 2001 gave him the leeway to enact new routines aimed at process innovations to 
reduce contamination, leveraging new innovative capabilities to face the threat of environmental 
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decline. The salience of this triggering event in our analysis emphasizes the fact that the top 
management, as the primary agent determining the fit between strategy and environment, 
scanned and interpreted the organization’s environment, made strategic choices, monitoring their 
results. In order to achieve strategic change, the replacement of top management is sometimes 
required in order to be effective (Bluedorn et al., 1994, p. 203).  
The Capability Renewal stage started with re-thinking the industry situation and the 
future of the organization if the internal status quo were preserved; TCA-induced cork taint now 
was seen as an existential threat requiring immediate managerial attention. Coupled with 
rethinking organizational skills and capabilities, this sensemaking process led to tangible 
organizational actions creating new capabilities, assembling new underlying routines and 
acquiring necessary resources, ultimately resulting in an effective domain defense strategy. 
Whereas most prior studies emphasize the incumbent’s struggle to adapt or the 
imperative to embrace the radical innovation by either abandoning the existing technology or 
integrating existing and rival technologies (e.g., Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2015; Adner & Snow, 
2010; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003), committing to an established approach can also be a rational 
and radically innovative strategy that builds on tradition rather than usurping it.2 Of course, a 
single success case study cannot be generalized to all situations (one need only beware of the 
counter-example of Kodak, where sticking to the existing technology led to disaster); additional 
studies will be needed to establish a fuller range of contextual factors determining optimal 
                                                          
2 Adner & Snow (2010) term this the “race” generic strategy. Notably, whereas “a firm’s ability to race against the 
new technology — improving the old technology’s performance — depends largely on firm and technology 




In line with the conceptual integrative framework of Eggers and Kaplan (2013), we contribute to 
the limited literature interconnecting cognition and capabilities by showing how managerial 
cognition plays an essential role in sensing, interpreting, encoding, and retrieving prior 
experiences in the construction of organizational routines. In particular, the process model 
(summarized in Figure 1) unpacks the cognitive dynamics behind capability development and 
deployment within an organization facing existential threat from emerging radical innovation. 
On the basis of a longitudinal case study, the current paper demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
incumbent’s strategy of capability enhancement (along the established trajectory). In addition, 
we integrated managerial cognition and capability development and deployment views, depicting 
the dynamics of an incumbent’s capability enhancement process as comprising two key stages 
(rigidity and capability renewal) with a triggering event between them, providing a detailed 
analysis of the cognitive drivers of organizational actions in all stages. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary theoretical contribution of the current study is the development of an inductively 
developed cognitive process model incorporating and synthesizing two distinct streams of 
literature – (1) managerial cognition and (2) capability development and deployment views – 
with which to explain the capability enhancement process that incumbents enact amid radical 
innovation causing turmoil in its industry. In particular, we scrutinize the cognitive drivers of 
organizational actions in all stages of the model (rigidity, triggering event, and capability 
renewal) and elucidate the role of top management cognition in the processes of detection and 
correction of errors in strategic courses of action. The two-stage dynamic model of capability 
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enhancement (‘rigidity’ – ‘triggering event’ – ‘capability renewal’) that the paper presents 
further develops the more general capability lifecycle process of Helfat and Peteraf (2003).  
In particular, we contribute to the literature on radical innovation dynamics by providing 
a case clearly demonstrating the viability of an incumbent strategy of fighting back against an 
emerging radical innovation. Incumbent fightback is best done through capability enhancement 
aligned with an established technological trajectory and resource base in which its existing 
strengths reside. As such, our paper is a caution against an excessive emphasis on disruption as 
the most vital form of innovation (Christensen & Bower, 1996). 
All theoretical and empirical contributions have contextual limitations imposed by the 
bounded rationality of both empirics and theory. An initial limitation is that much of the behavior 
of COR, especially its organizational identity, is doubtless due to it being family-owned – as are 
many enterprises in traditional industrial areas in Europe. While learning myopia can provoke 
incumbents to ignore the long run and discount the impact of new entrants and technologies or 
business models (Vlaar, De Vries, & Willenborg, 2005), being a family owned firm mitigates 
such short sightedness. It was for this reason that the family member CEO was a key informant. 
During the course of the empirical analysis, it became clear that the organizational identity of 
COR was shaped and determined by it being a family business, and in turn, the family strongly 
associated itself with cork. It would therefore be interesting to study the extent to which being a 
family owned organization helped COR in its fight against synthetic stoppers and refusal to 
adopt rival technologies, as well as the extent to which the embeddedness of the family 
enterprise in a local community created patterns of worker deference (Mann, 1995) to 
organizational strategy, rather than creative resistance to change (Courpasson, Dany & Clegg, 
 38
2012). Tradition was both a liability and an asset.  
Two other essential limitations of this study are worth particular notice. First, COR’s 
effective domain defense strategy based on incumbent technology may not be generalizable to 
other industries, where alliances or adopting rival, radical new technology may indeed be the 
best strategy. Therefore, further studies – moving beyond a single case analysis – are needed to 
test the external validity of the reported findings regarding the optimal generic incumbent 
responses, which will obviously be context-dependent. Second, the current research’s theoretical 
lens is grounded in an internal managerial cognition view of environmental change; as such, it 
does not focus on essential contextual factors outside organizational boundaries, including the 
dynamics of shifting consumer perspectives on the emerging radical technology. In the case of 
the focal wine stopper industry, it is plausible that – despite the wine taint problem – many 
consumers still preferred cork for the traditional and valued ritual of extracting the cork with a 
corkscrew and that this demand characteristic shaped the optimal and behavioral responses of the 
company. Hence, we encourage further studies taking into account demand-side perspective on 
radical technological innovations.  
In terms of future research directions, in addition to domain defense, the company also 
engaged in ‘domain creation’ strategy, testing out new markets to deploy the existing 
technology; that is, leveraging existing resources to renew itself outside the cork stopper 
industry. In doing so, the firm appears to have enacted “dynamic capabilities” to focus on the 
reconfiguration of its internal resources. Dynamic capabilities allow organizations to recombine 
and reconfigure assets as well as organizational structures, as markets and technologies change 
(Teece, 2006). The importance of applying a cognitive lens to reconfiguration of organizational 
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resources in line with dynamic capabilities was noted by Danneels (2011) as revealing “a gap in 
current dynamic capability theory, namely that it is necessary to consider managerial resource 
cognition in order to understand the actual or potential exercise of dynamic capability” and that 
“it is not only resources that affect dynamic capability but also cognition about those 
resources”(p.26). Hence, by hooking up dynamic capabilities with managerial cognition we bring 
together two influential streams in current strategy research. 
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Technical details: Process innovations to counter the TCA menace 
The very survival of not just the stopper business unit but of the financial health and continued 
existence of the whole cork firm rode on the success of eliminating the TCA menace. COR’s 
contamination reduction strategy was built on what R&D head Miguel Cabral termed as the ‘3 
pillars’: prevention, cure and control. While the factory managers were responsible for the 
implementation of these measures, Cabral had a direct responsibility in making sure that norms 
were followed, besides being responsible for implementing new methods to detect TCA. During 
the factory visit, Cabral reviewed each of the stages in the decontamination process with us. We 
summarize below our findings on the process innovations undertaken by COR to decontaminate 
cork. 
Preventive measures 
While in the past, the pallets with the bales of bark arriving at the factories were left on the 
ground, rendering them vulnerable to fungus attacks, now they are placed on an inclined concrete 
floor that allows for rainwater drainage. The six-month seasoning of the cork bark that follows is 
now undertaken at COR’s factories, not at the suppliers’ warehouse, as was previously the case. 
Any cork coming into contact with the ground during the seasoning period is used for non-
stopper products. All the cork bark earmarked for wine stoppers is placed and stored in stainless 
steel pallets in the factories. The airing that occurs during the seasoning process also helps 
reduce TCA formation. Before the boiling stage, the barks undergo a cutting process, with 
Cabral emphasizing that, currently, these cuts were being made about 10 cm above the floor 
height, which is understood to have the minimum risk of contaminating different samples in an 
experiment.  
The boiling process has undergone many significant changes. It previously involved boiling five 
pallets of bark simultaneously, using the same water until it was completely evaporated. Since 
the pallets were compressed each on top of the other, when decompressed, they had a high water 
content, with approximately 40% humidity. In a marked departure from this practice, a new 
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system involves boiling two pallets at a time, which does not compress them. The water is 
removed after boiling forty tons of cork bales and during the boiling process the water passes 
through a system where any volatile elements present are extracted. This important innovation 
involving continuous volatile extraction (or CONVEX, as the new system is known) leads to a 
lower humidity content of the cork due to non-compression of the two pallets.  
Curative extraction process 
The vaporization and steaming processes implemented at COR has, over the last decade, perhaps 
contributed most toward reducing TCA contamination. The curative extraction process 
essentially involves two stages— vaporization of the contaminants in raw cork and steaming of 
cork stoppers. COR now employs a second generation cleaning process (called INOS II), a 
system patented in 2001 and used for Amorim’s technical corks. INOS II utilizes a 
hydrodynamic extraction process to wash deep within the cork structure to flush out 
contaminants. After the final wash, the disks are dried in ovens and with sterilized air to a level 
of 6-8% relative humidity to retain flexibility.  
The main objective of the vaporization process is the decontamination of raw materials, more 
specifically of the TCA present in the cork. After boiling, not only do TCA and other volatile 
compounds get extracted from the bales of cork, but also homogenization of moisture makes the 
cork barks easier to work with when punched to create cork stoppers.  
Patented in 2004, Rate of Optimal Steam Application (ROSA) is applied to the cork granules 
used to produce Amorim´s technical stoppers and the new generation (Advantec® and 
Neutrocork) cork stoppers. The process is based on steam distillation to force out volatile trace 
compounds within the cork cells, with the decontamination treatment lasting approximately 
thirty minutes, which has been found to reduce incidence of TCA by 80%. While ROSA is 
effective for agglomerated stoppers, the high temperatures of this process would render it futile 
for natural cork stoppers due to resulting deformation. The solution for natural cork stoppers 
came in the form of ROSA Evolution, a process patented in 2007, whereby the natural corks 
were subjected to a constantly renewed system of high humidity and temperature but well below 
the temperature of the ROSA. The treatment time, however, was eight times greater compared to 
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ROSA, requiring a total of 4 hours.  
Control measures 
Most wine drinkers can detect TCA at a concentration level of above 5 ng/liter (five parts per 
trillion), with TCA easier to spot in tainted whites than heavy reds. COR has adopted a chemical 
analysis technology developed at ETS laboratories in California, which involves gas 
chromatography with mass detection or capture electron (GC-MS and GC-ECD), similar to that 
used for forensic evidence in the television series CSI. While the analyses are done mostly for 
the wine stoppers, periodically samples of cork from the cork pallets are also subjected to 
chromatography analysis.  
The control measures continue after the curative process, where besides gas chromatography, a 
sensorial analysis is undertaken, whereby samples of premium natural cork stoppers are analyzed 
based on the ISO 22308-2005 methodology. The sensorial process involves soaking 5 cork 
stoppers from a lot in 100 ml distilled water during 24h at 30ºC with 20 soaks per lot. The 
rejection criterion is 10% of faulty samples detected by 50% of the testers. An important ongoing 
project (2013-2015), now in its trial phase, is a new way to analyze TCA. A British firm, under 
contract with COR (the name of the firm was not disclosed to the researchers for proprietary 
reasons), is developing this GC-TCA detector, capable of analyzing individual corks for TCA. 
The machine individually tests TCA presence in corks. Currently the gas chromatograph 
technology requires over twenty-four hour incubation periods. The new GC-ECD machines 
require the corks to be in a chamber for a much shorter incubation period; after this short period 
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